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The South Carolina Supreme Court has long held that
in certain tort actions, nominal damages may be recovered
from the mere invasion of a party's rights without a demon-
stration of actual damages.1 However, in a tort action based
on negligence, it is fundamental that the person pleading
negligence show by competent evidence that he has been in-
jured by the negligence and that the negligence was the prox-
imate cause of the injury.2 Although mathematical certainty
is not required in the proof of actual damages, neither the
existence, causation, nor amount of damages can be left to
conjecture, guess, or speculation.3 Thus the question posed in
Gray v. Southern Facilities, Inc.4 was whether a depreciation
in the value of real estate is a proper element of damages when
the evidence showed no permanent, physical injury to the
property. In the principal case, appellant property owner at-
tempted to show by expert witness that the market value and
sales potential of his property had been diminished by the
respondent petroleum plant's single negligent act that allowed
gasoline to flow into a stream adjacent to appellant's prop-
erty.5 Appellant's claim for damages was predicated upon
the psychological factor that prospective buyers would be
reluctant to purchase the property for fear of similar occur-
1. Jones v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 108 S.C. 217, 94 S.E. 490 (1917).
2. National Loan & Exchange Bank v. Lachovitz, 131 S.C. 432, 128 S.E. 10
(1925). See generally, C. McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES
§22 (1935), and 38 Am[JUR. Negligence §28 (1941).
3. Piggy Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Schofield, 251 S.C. 385, 162 S.E.2d 705
(1968).
4. 256 S.C. 558, 183 S.E.2d 438 (1971).
5. The general rule involved in the measure and elements of damages re-
suling from the pollution of a stream is that a landowner may recover for
depreciation of market value if the injury is permanent or irreparable. If the
injury is temporary or abateable, recovery is limited to the depreciation in
rental or usable value of the property during the period of the pollution. Annot.,
49 A.L.R.2d 253 (1956). South Carolina follows this general rule. Threatt v.
Brewer Mining Co., 49 S.C. 95, 26 S.E. 970 (1897); Williams v. Haile Gold
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rences in the future.8 Under the circumstances of this case,
the court concluded that it was unnecessary to decide whether,
or under what circumstances, an injury to the reputation of
real property might be a proper element of damages. The
court noted that the evidence showed four petroleum plants,
including that of the respondent's, operating upstream from
the appellant's property but that no evidence was presented
tending to connect the respondent rather than the other pe-
troleum plants as the source of the alleged damage to appel-
lant's property. In its holding, the court concluded:
The evidence as to the diminution of market value is, in our view,
speculative, not only as to the amount but speculative as to the portion
thereof proximately and directly resulting from the one delict on the
part of the respondents complained of and proved. Accordingly, such
evidence was of no real probative value in ascertaining the amount of
any actual damage to the market value of appellant's property resulting
from respondent's single wrongful act.7
B. Salvage Rule
The valued policy statute,8 requiring parties to a fire
insurance contract to agree on and to include within the con-
tract's terms the value of the insured building, was designed
to eliminate future controversies between the parties in assess-
ing the extent of loss recoverable should the building be dam-
aged by fire. Prior to 1932, the South Carolina Supreme Court
had applied various rules under the terms of the statute to
measure the recoverable damage resulting from a partial loss
6. In the instant case the petroleum spillage was ignited by causes unknown
but no actual or physical damage resulted to appellant's home or property from
the fire.
7. 256 S.C. at 571, 183 S.E.2d at 444.
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-154 (1962). Prior to 1947, Section 37-154 provided
in part:
[I]n case of total loss by fire, the insured shall be entitled to
recover the full amount of insurance and a proportionate amount
in case of partial loss (Emphasis added).
Act No. 232, Acts of 1947, amended the valued policy statute to read, in its
present form:
[I]n case of total loss by fire, the insured shall be entitled to
recover the full amount of insurance, and in case of a partial loss
the insured shall be entitled to recover the actual amount of the
loss, but in no event more than the amount of the insurance stated
in the contract (Emphasis added).
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol24/iss4/6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [
by fireA However, based on Section 37-154 as it existed prior
to 1947, the court had determined that in all cases, the proper
measure of damages should be in accordance with the "salvage
rule."'1 Under this rule the amount of recovery was deter-
mined by subtracting the salvage value of the damaged build-
ing from the agreed value of the building as set forth in the
policy, limited by the amount of insurance bought. The facts
of Division of General Services v. Ulmer"' revealed that a
school building, partially destroyed by fire, had a stated policy
value of $360,000, an actual value of $233,800, and was in-
sured for $250,000. The salvage value of the portion of the
building left after the fire was $85,000. In a declaratory judg-
ment the lower court applied the salvage rule and determined
the benefits recoverable amounted to $250,000. Division of
General Services, the insurer, contended that the result of the
1947 amendment to Section 37-154 was to adopt the common
law rule of recovery-i.e., the extent of damages recoverable
is to be measured by the actual amount of loss sustained based
on the cost of repairs. Use of the common law rule would re-
sult in a recovery by respondent school board of between
$148,000 and $168,000.12 Thus the question confronting the
court was the effect of the 1947 amendment to the valued
policy statute on the proper measure of damages to be applied
in the collection of benefits growing out of a fire insurance
policy. In redefining the measure of recovery under code
section 37-154, the court concluded:
The effect of the amendment was to abolish the salvage rule. The
legislature has amended the law so as to provide recovery for the
9. The common law rule of recovery is measured by the actual amount
of loss sustained based on the cost to repair. Columbia Real Estate & Trust Co.
v. Royal Exchange Assurance, 132 S.C. 427, 128 S.E. 865 (1925); Parnell v.
Orient Ins. Co., 126 S.C. 198, 119 S.E. 191 (1923). The percentage rule, based
on maritime law, measures recovery by the portion of the agreed value that
the amount of the insured's loss bears to the stated value of the property before
the loss. Ford v. George Washington Fire Ins. Co., 139 S.C. 212, 137 S.E. 678
(1927).
10, Bruner v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, 165 S.C. 421, 164 S.E.
134 (1932). See also, Fowler v. Merchants' Fire Assurance Corp., 172 S.C.
66, 172 S.E. 781 (1934) and Aiken v. Home Ins. Co., 137 S.C. 248, 134 S.E.
870 (1926).
11. 256 S.C. 523, 183 S.E.2d 315 (1971).
12. The $20,000 differential in the estimated repair costs resulted from a
question of whether the estimate should include modifications in compliance
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"actual amount of the loss." Such is plain on its face and the words
must be given their plain meaning.'
3
C. Collateral Source Rule
In New Foundation Baptist Church kv. Davis'4 the South
Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed the use of the collateral
source rule which holds that "total or partial compensation
for injury which an injured party receives from a collateral
source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer, does not op-
erate to lessen the damages recoverable from the wrong-
doer."'' 5 In the principal case, respondent New Foundation
Baptist Church brought suit against appellant contractor for
damages sustained when the floor of an addition to the sanc-
tuary collapsed allegedly as a result of negligent construction.
Respondent sought both actual and punitive damages but the
jury returned a verdict for actual damages only. Asserting
that the verdict was excessive, appellant contended that the
actual damage should be measured by the actual cost of the
repairs made ($3000), rather than the estimated cost of re-
pairs which included the profits of the contractor ($4746).
The actual repairs had been made by a contractor who was
a member and trustee of the respondent church and who
waived any profit he might receive from the repairs by donat-
ing his time and services. Having already applied the collat-
eral source rule in a variety of factual situations, 6 the court
found little difficulty in extending the rule to cover situations
in which repairs are made without charge to the injured party
by a third person.17 The court concluded that "[t]he facts of
this case are clearly one for the application of that rule....
13. 256 S.C. at 533-34, 183 S.E.2d at 319.
14. 186 S.E.2d 247 (S.C. 1971).
15. Id. at 249. See also, 22 Am. Jua2d Damages §206 (1965).
16. Young v. Warr, 252 S.C. 179, 165 S.E.2d 797 (1969) (continued mili-
tary pay and Veteran Administration benefits); Powers v. Temple, 250 S.C.
149, 156 S.E.2d 759 (1967) (workman's compensation) ; Scott v. Southern Ry.,
231 S.C. 28, 97 S.E.2d 73 (1957) (gratuitous loan of automobile); Joiner v.
Fort, 226 S.C. 249, 84 S.E.2d 719 (1954) and Jeffords v. Florence County, 165
S.C. 15, 162 S.E. 574 (1932) (receipt of accident insurance benefits).
17. Accord, Ostmo v. Tennyson, 70 N.D. 558, 296 N.W. 541 (1941).
18. 186 S.E.2d at 249.
19721
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II. PERSONAL INJURY
A. Future Damages
Haltiwanger v. Barr9 was an action for property damage
and personal injuries sustained when appellant's intestate's
automobile crossed three lanes and a median of a four-lane
highway to collide with respondent Haltiwanger's automobile.
Respondent's motion for summary judgment was granted and
the issue of actual damages was submitted to the jury. Appeal-
ing the verdict of $64,000, the appellant contended that the
verdict was so excessive as to show capriciousness and preju-
dice on the part of the jury.20 A review of the evidence and
testimony tended to reveal that respondent sustained a "resid-
ual permanent impairment" of fifteen percent to his spine;
that the impairment had caused the respondent pain and suf-
fering which might recur in the future; that corrective sur-
gery may not alleviate the future pain and suffering; that the
respondent might lose up to $26,000 in income by reason of
impairment of health, and that respondent's life expectancy
was 39.43 years.
In evaluating damages for future pain and suffering, the
court noted that "recovery must be had for future pain and
suffering ... to the extent that these injuries are reasonably
certain to result in the future from the injury complained
of."2'1 Despite evidence showing that respondent had received
pay increases since the accident and that corrective surgery
might be successful, the court affirmed the award concluding
that "[t] he rule is not always easy to apply. Future damages
in personal injury cases need not be proved to a mathematical
certainty. Oftentimes a verdict involving future damages must
be approximated. A wide latitude is allowed the jury."
22
B. Federal Employers' Liability Act
Isgett v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. 23 involved an
action brought by a railroad employee under the Federal
19. 186 S.E.2d 819 (S.C. 1972).
20. It should be noted that the court will not set aside a verdict because
the amount indicates undue liberality on the part of the jury. The verdict must
be grossly excessive to set it aside absolutely. Nelson v. Charleston & Western
Carolina Ry., 226 S.C. 515, 86 S.E.2d 56 (1955). See also, C. McCoRMICK,
HANDBOOK ON TIlE LAW OF DAMAGES § 18 (1935).
21. 186 S.E.2d at 821.
22. Id.
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Employers' Liability Act 24 for personal injuries allegedly
sustained as a result of defendant employer's negligence.
Following the employee's death from injuries unrelated to the
negligence, the executor of his estate was substituted under
the appropriate sections of the South Carolina code.25 As a
finding of fact, the district court concluded that defendant
employer, having knowledge of Isgett's diabetic condition,
was negligent in failing to provide the plaintiff a safe place
to work, in compelling the plaintiff to wear "safety shoes"
which fostered blister injuries and diabetic ulcers on his feet,
and in failing to exercise due care in certifying the plaintiff
fit to return to work under such conditions. The result of
defendant's negligence was a history of blister injury and
gangrene that culminated in the amputation of both of plain-
tiff's feet.
As a conclusion of law, the United States District Court
for South Carolina found that the plaintiff was entitled to
damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Al-
though federal courts generally apply the state law as to
damages, the court noted that because the action arose solely
from the federal act, damages were to be settled according
to the general principles of damages as administered in the
federal courts.26 Accordingly, the court awarded a total of
$61,241.2527 in damages to the executor of Isgett's estate. The
measure of the entitlement was: (1) Hospital expenses-
$3501.25; (2) Incidental and special damages including drug
bills, the cost of a wheel chair and special modifications to
24. 45 U.S.C. § 51 provides in part:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce
between any of the several States or Territories . . . shall be
liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is
employed by such carrier in such commerce . . . for such injury
or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any
of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason
of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars,
engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats,
wharves, or other equipment.
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-209 (1962).
26. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916). See also,
Note 1542, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51.
27. Due to the early demise of the plaintiff the award is considerably
smaller than might be expected if the plaintiff had survived the cause of action.
Compare, Hubbard v. Long Island R.R., 152 F.Supp. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), and
Dagnello v. Long Island R.R., 193 F.Supp. 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
19721
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plaintiff's home and automobile, rehabilitation attempts, and
attendance and supervision care-$5740.00; (3) Pain and suf-
fering-10,000; (4) Mental anguish-$15,000.00; (5) Loss
of earnings at light work-$9,000.00; and (6) The loss of
both legs and their attendant use-$18,000.00.
III. EMINENT DOMAIN
The power of eminent domain is firmly grounded in the
concept of state sovereignty2s and may be delegated by the
state to its agencies and municipal corporations 29 or to pri-
vate corporations acquiring land for a public use.30 In any
case, the South Carolina Constitution requires that "just com-
pensation" be paid for any land acquired under the state's
authority. 31 Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Copeland32 in-
volved a condemnation proceeding instituted by a power com-
pany under the appropriate provisions of the state code to
acquire a right of way across a landowner's property for the
construction of power lines.33 The issue confronting the South
Carolina Supreme Court was whether interest could be recov-
ered by the landowner in a condemnation proceeding where
the taking was by a private corporation. In the lower court,
the jury returned a verdict in favor of the landowner for
$38,000. The judge granted the condemnor's motion for a new
trial on the ground of the excessiveness of the verdict unless
the landowner agreed to reduce the verdict to $25,000. The
landowner agreed and the judge, considering the question of
interest, ordered that the condemnor pay interest on the ver-
28. Riley v. S.C. Hwy. Dep't., 238 S.C. 19, 118 S.E.2d 809 (1961).
29. Sease v. City of Spartanburg, 242 S.C. 520, 131 S.E.2d 683 (1963).
30. Atkinson v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 239 S.C. 150, 121 S.E.2d
743 (1961).
31. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 17 provides:
Private property shall not be taken for private use without the
consent of the owner, nor for public use without just compensa-
tion being first paid therefor.
S.C. CoNsT. art. IX, § 20 provides:
No right of way shall be appropriated to the use of any corpora-
tion until full compensation therefor shall be first made to the
owner or secured by a deposit of money, irrespective of any
benefit from any improvement proposed by such corporation,
which compensation shall be ascertained by a jury of twelve men,
in a court of record, as shall be prescribed by law.
32. 188 S.E.2d 188 (S.C. 1972).
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dict from the date the judgment on the verdict was entered,
until the date the judgment was paid. Both condemnor and
landowner appealed on the issue of the right to interest-the
condemnor asserting that no interest should be allowed and
the landowner asserting that the interest should be computed
from the date of the initial taking.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed and remanded
the case on other grounds 34 but because the question of in-
terest would -be likely to arise after the new trial, the court
attempted to dispose of the issue and was sharply divided.35
The condemnor relied on a series of highway condemnation
cases3 6 which held that the absence of an express provision
for the award of interest in the highway condemnation stat-
utes37 was not an oversight by the legislature and consequently
should not be remedied by reading a provision for interest
into the acts. Noting that no provision for interest appeared
in the sections of the code authorizing condemnations by
power companies, 38 Justice Littlejohn concluded that there
was no authority for the allowance of interest in the principal
case. Justice Brailsford and the majority of the court con-
cluded, however, that the holdings in the highway condemna-
tion cases were of no concern in a case where the taking was
by a private corporation and that interest may be recovered
on the award from the time of the judgment to the date of the
payment of the award.3 9 As to the question of interest from
the date of the initial taking until the date of the judgment
34. The Court was also confronted with the issue of the admissibility of
certain expert testimony concerning the valuation of the land taken and the
special damages to the remainder. The Court unanimously reversed and re-
manded on the issue of the admissibility of the challenged testimony but was
divided on the issue of the allowance of interest. A discussion of the eviden-
tiary aspects of the case is included in the section on Evidence, infra.
35. The unusual construction of the opinion may provide a source of con-
fusion as to the holding of the Court. Although the opinion by Justice Little-
john, which reversed and remanded the case on the issue of the admissibility of
the challenged evidence, is labeled the majority opinion, the opinion by Justice
Brailsford in which he is joined by the remainder of the Court, sets out the
majority's view on the question of the allowance of interest.
36. S.C. Hwy. Dep't. v. Sharpe, 242 S.C. 397, 131 S.E.2d 257 (1963);
S.C. Hwy. Dep't. v. Schrimpf, 242 S.C. 357, 131 S.E.2d 44 (1963) ; and S.C.
Hwy. Dep't. v. Southern Ry., 239 S.C. 1, 121 S.E.2d 236 (1961).
37. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-135. 33-136 (1962).
38. See note 33, supra.
39. See Haig v. Wateree Power Co., 119 S.C. 319, 112 S.E. 55 (1922).
19721
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on the verdict, the court concluded that the right to interest
depended upon he facts of each particular case and should be
submitted by appropriate instructions to the jury for de-
termination.
40
IV. FRAUDULENT BREACH OF CONTRACT
In actions based solely upon breach of contract, the over-
whelming majority of decisions deny recovery of exemplary
or punitive damages.41 However, it has long been held in South
Carolina that a breach of contract committed with a fraudu-
lent intent and accompanied by a fraudulent act will support
a recovery of punitive damages.42 Thus the question posed in
Vann v. Nationwide Ins. Co. 43 was whether an insurance com-
pany's refusal to make payments under one portion of an
automobile liability policy until the insured settled his liability
claim under another section, constituted a "fraudulent act"
that entitled the recovery of punitive damages. The appellant
Vann, while driving an automobile insured by the respondent,
was involved in a collision with an uninsured motorist. Ap-
pellant's insurance policy provided for medical benefits under
one section and also included a provision entitling recovery
for losses resulting from an accident involving an uninsured
motorist. In the complaint, the appellant alleged that the re-
fusal of the insurer to pay his liquidated claim for medical
benefits until he submitted his claim for loss under the unin-
sured motorist provisions, constituted a breach of the insur-
ance contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. The trial court
granted the respondent's motion to strike all allegations of
the complaint appropriate to the recovery of punitive dam-
ages. In affirming, the Supreme Court noted that to recover
punitive damages, the breach of contract must be accom-
40. Justice Brailsford noted that because of varying factual situations, it
would be impossible to prescribe a definite form of instruction to the jury but
suggested reference to the instructions set forth in the Southern Ry. opinion,
cited note 36, supra.
41. See generally, C. McCoamicic, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES
§ 81 (1935).
42. Corley v. Coastal States Life Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 1, 135 S.E.2d 316
(1964) ; Holland v. Spartanburg Herald-Journal Co., 166 S.C. 454, 165 S.E.2d
203 (1932) ; Prince v. State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 S.C. 187, 57 S.E. 766 (1907);
Welborn v. Dixon, 70 S.C. 108, 49 S.E. 232 (1904).
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panied by a fraudulent act independent of the breach itself.44
It is necessary to plead acts beyond the mere withholding of
a contract obligation or benefit in order to infer a fraudulent
act,45 and under the circumstances of this case:
[T]he refusal of the respondent to make payment of the amount due
the appellant under the medical provision of the liability insurance
policy unless the appellant would settle his liability claim under the
uninsured motorist coverage provision was not a fraudulent act. There
was no change of position of the appellant because of any alleged
fraudulent act on the part of the respondent. The respondent did noth-
ing that would prevent the appellant from seeking to recover any
actual damages which he may have by reason of the alleged breach
of the contract or alleged failure to pay.
4 6
THOMAS C. SALANE
44. See Calder v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 182 S.C. 240, 188 S.E. 864
(1936). Punitive damages are not recoverable for the mere failure or refusal
to pay a debt. Patterson v. Capital Life & Health Ins. Co., 228 S.C. 297, 89
S.E.2d 723 (1955).
45. Compare Corley v. Coastal States Life Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 1, 135 S.E.2d
316 (1964).
46. 257 S.C. at 221, 185 S.E.2d at 364-65.
19721
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